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Will a Repeal of Gun Manufacturer Immunity from Civil
Suits Untie the Hands of the Judiciary?
John Fowler
Code Sections Affected
Civil Code §§ 1714 (amended), 1714.4 (repealed).
SB 682 (Perata); 2002 STAT. Ch. 913.
I. TAKING A BEAD ON GUN MANUFACTURERS
In 1983, the California Legislature created a statutory bar to gun
manufacturer liability in civil suits for the misuse of firearms.' Immunity was
justified as a codification of existing common law.2 Chapter 913 repeals that
statutory provision. The resulting question is: so what? Will courts begin to hold
gun manufacturers liable for gun misuse absent statutory immunity? In other
words, has the common law or public policy changed in the past two decades,
and if so, to what extent does the change advantage future plaintiffs? Assessing
the significance of claims against the gun industry in the post-immunity
environment requires surveying the arsenal of legal theories traditionally
available to plaintiffs in products liability actions and exploring the contours of
the policy debate surrounding Chapter 913.
II. THE LEGAL ARSENAL
A. Negligence Theories
California allows an injured plaintiff to recover against the producer of a
dangerous or defective product under three primary legal theories: breach of
warranty, negligence, and strict liability.4 The foundation of California
negligence law, as codified in section 1714 of the California Civil Code, holds
each person responsible for injuries caused to another by his lack of due care or
skill.5 Gun manufacturers may be held liable for negligence demonstrated in the
entrustment, marketing, manufacture, and design of their firearms.6
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1998).
2. Id. § 1714.4(d).
3. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 2 (May 14, 2002).
4. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 3 (May 14, 2002)
(stating that the three categories of liability appropriately used against a product manufacturer are breach of
express or implied warranty, negligence, and strict liability).
5. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West 1998) (stating that
[e]very one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property
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A negligent entrustment claim typically alleges that a manufacturer provided
a firearm to a consumer group foreseeably lacking the capacity to exercise
ordinary care.7 However, the court in Linton v. Smith & Wesson refused to allow
a negligent entrustment claim to proceed against a gun manufacturer for selling a
weapon to the general public, ultimately used in a criminal shooting, reasoning
that the general public does not lack the capacity to exercise ordinary care. 8
Other negligence actions brought against gun manufacturers for injuries due
to criminal shootings have failed for lack of duty or causation. 9 The court, in
Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Company, found that the dealer of a non-
defective product had no duty to anticipate injury caused by its criminal misuse.'0
Similarly, the court, in Moore v. R.G. Industries, Inc., refused to extend liability
to a manufacturer for lack of a causal connection between the manufacture and
marketing of a handgun and the plaintiff's injury."
Courts have typically held that gun manufacturers have no duty to refrain
from marketing lawful products in light of their lethal nature.12 The existence of a
duty is determined by the court as a matter of law upon consideration of policy
factors, including the presence of a special relationship between the parties and
the foreseeability of the resulting harm.' 3 Courts generally have refused to hold
or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the
injury upon himself.).
6. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 3-4 (May 14, 2002)
(defining the various negligence theories commonly argued against gun manufacturers); see generally David
Polin, Cause of Action Against Manufacturer for Negligent Marketing of Firearm, in 15 CAUSES OF ACTION
SECOND § 6 (West 2000) (outlining considerations and case law relevant to negligent marketing suits against
gun manufacturers).
7. See Polin, supra note 6, § 3 (discussing negligent entrustment cases in the context of gun
manufacturer liability).
8. See 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Il. App. Ct. 1984) (distinguishing a negligent entrustment claim against a
gun manufacturer selling to the general public from one against a toy manufacturer that sold an air rifle to a
child, by noting that children comprise "a class of persons known to be irresponsible in the use of such
products.").
9. See Deborah Robinson, Point Blank: Product Liability Law Takes Aim at Guns, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL'Y 88, 89-90 (2000) (stating that "courts have easily dispensed with these negligence actions" alleging the
"manufacture and sale of firearms to the general public created an unreasonable risk of harm" by holding that
"manufacturers owe [the general public] no duty.., for legally-made products"); see, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc.,
194 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1055, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (failing to find that Glock owed plaintiffs a duty because the
foresecability of their injuries was too attenuated and that Glock was not in sufficient control of the weapons
used to support a finding of proximate cause).
10. See 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (holding a manufacturer's duty to prevent an
unreasonable risk of harm to users of its product extended only to those who used the product lawfully).
II. See 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that California products liability law does not
allow recovery against a manufacturer for intentional injuries caused by a properly functioning handgun).
12. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 5 (May 14, 2002); see,
e.g., Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 931, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484 (1976) (finding that a
seller has no duty to ensure its products are sold to individuals who will not misuse them, unless it has
knowledge that such misuse will follow).
13. lleto, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1050; see, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 899
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that whether a duty exists is a matter of law to be determined by the court upon
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that a manufacturer's marketing decisions could foreseeably result in injury from
misuse of a well-made product. 14 An exception is found in the Hamilton v. Accu-
Tek (Hamilton 1) decision, which ascribed a duty on a gun manufacturer to use
reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of its products so as to guard
against foreseeable criminal misuse.' 5 Hamilton I, however, was overturned on
appeal after the New York Court of Appeals, on certification, determined that
state law did not support finding such a duty of care owing. 
6
B. Strict Liability and the Risk/Utility Analysis
Strict liability theories do not require a showing of negligence for liability to
flow.17 The strict liability theories argued in cases against firearms manufacturers
include strict liability for ultrahazardous activities and strict products liability.' 8
Courts have held that, as a matter of law, the manufacture or sale of a firearm is
not an ultrahazardous activity.' 9 For example, Louisiana law prevents a plaintiff
from prevailing on a theory that the marketing of firearms to the public
constitutes an ultrahazardous activity on two grounds: (1) criminal misuse is not
a foreseeable result of marketing firearms, and (2) the ultrahazardous activity
doctrine is restricted to activities involving land ownership. 20 Thus, victims of
gun violence usually sue gun manufacturers in strict products liability, alleging
that the gun used was defective in its manufacture or design.2
consideration of policy factors including: "(1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the
actor's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences
of imposing a duty upon the actor; (5) and the overall public interest in the proposed solution.").
14. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(b) (West 1998) (stating that "[i]njuries or damages resulting from the
discharge of a firearm or ammunition are not proximately caused by its potential to cause serious injury,
damage, or death, but... by the actual discharge of the product."); see also Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d
758, 762 (D.C. App. 1989) (stating that "no liability exists in tort for... criminal acts of third parties").
15. See 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Hamilton 1] (distinguishing past
negligent marketing cases from plaintiffs' theory which alleged that certain guns should not be marketed based
upon their lack of social utility, rather than focusing on the defendant's particular marketing practices in light of
its knowledge of criminal access to its distribution channels).
16. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Hamilton I1]
(reporting the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in response to certified questions regarding duty and
market-share liability).
17. See Merrill v. Navegar, 26 Cal. 4th 465, 479, 28 P.3d 116, 124-25 (2001) (explaining that, in
contrast to strict liability, under a negligence theory a plaintiff must prove that a defect caused injury and,
additionally, that the defect resulted from the defendant's negligence).
18. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 6-7 (May 14, 2002).
19. See Navegar, 26 Cal. 4th at 475, 28 P.3d at 122 (stating, as to the plaintiff's ultrahazardous activities
claim, the court held that, "as a matter of law, the manufacture and distribution of a firearm, even an assault
weapon, is not inherently dangerous."); see also Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the marketing of handguns is not an ultrahazardous activity).
20. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1251, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
marketing of a firearm is not an ultrahazardous activity and all liability imposed under the theory concerned
land use).
21. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 6 (May 14, 2002)
(stating that "[miost products liability cases are brought on a theory of strict products liability" and that "a strict
product liability action may be brought with regard to a defect in manufacture or a defect in design.").
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Strict products liability suits typically fail due to the plaintiffs inability to
prove that the gun used was defective.22 A gun may be shown to be defective in
manufacture if it fails to perform as the manufacturer intended.23 The 1978
holding in Barker v. Lull Engineering Company established the notion that a
manufacturer of a well-made product could be held strictly liable in California
for injuries resulting from its product's defective design by showing either:
(1) "that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner"; or
(2) that if, "in light of the relevant factors.... the benefits of the
challenged design [do not] outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design.,
24
The first prong of the Barker analysis is not useful to plaintiffs in suits
against gun manufacturers because consumers have an expectation that guns are
designed to impart deadly force, thus cannot be considered defective for
functioning properly.25 In 1983, the California Legislature enacted section 1714.4
of the California Civil Code to prevent plaintiffs from using the second prong of
Barker (risk/utility analysis) against manufacturers of firearms and ammunition
in an effort to protect the industry from burgeoning litigation26 that threatened its
22. George L. Blum, Annotation, Firearm or Ammunition Manufacturer or Seller's Liability for Injuries
Caused to Another by Use of Gun in Committing Crime, 88 A.L.R. 5th 1, 14 (2001); see also Mamie L. Sayles
& the Honorable James R. Lambden, Stop Shooting Down Tort Liability: It is Time to Resuscitate the
Abnormally Dangerous Activity Doctrine Against Handgun Manufacturers, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 148
(2001) (discussing judicial refusal to hold gun manufacturers strictly liable for "well made" firearms that
perform exactly as intended).
23. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63 (1972) (explaining
that "it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using [a product] in a way it was intended
to be used as a result of a defect in ... manufacture").
24. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (1978) (stating that
in evaluating the adequacy of a product's design pursuant to [the risk/utility test], a jury may
consider, among other relevant factors, the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged
design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer
alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to
the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design.);
see also Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that "California product's
liability law imposes strict liability upon a manufacturer only when a defect exists in the design of the
product."); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 6 (May 14, 2002)
(indicating that the two-prong approach from Barker is viable under current California law to evaluate whether
a product is defective in design in a strict liability action).
25. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 89-91 (explaining the application of the consumer expectations and
risk/utility tests from Barker).
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1998); SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 75, at 1-3 (1983-84 Reg. Sess.) (May 25, 1983); see Sayles & Lambden, supra note 22, at 149-50,
(reasoning that the California Legislature passed AB 75 "presumably because [it] believed few firearms could
survive the risk/utility test [from Barker]").
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solvency.27 Chapter 913 repeals section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code,
giving courts latitude to revisit the question of gun manufacturer liability for gun
misuse.28
II1. THE HISTORICAL TERRAIN
A. Prior Legislation.: AB 75 to Section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code
Assembly Bill 75 (AB 75), passed by the California Legislature in 1983,
added section 1714.4 to the California Civil Code. 29 The language of section
1714.430 afforded gun manufacturers immunity to civil suits brought by shooting
victims that involved the application of the risk/utility calculus established in
Barker. 31 Section 1714.4 further provided that a firearm's potential to cause harm
did not render it defective in design and that the actual discharge of the weapon,
not its potential to be discharged, was the proximate cause of resulting harm.
32
Actions not barred by section 1714.4 included those alleging the improper
selection of design alternatives,33 the breach of a duty to warn in light of a
malfunctioning product,
34 and the furnishing of a statutorily banned weapon.
35
When enacted, section 1714.4 applied retroactively to knock out existing suits by
precluding courts from holding furnishers or sellers of firearms or ammunition
liable except as specified within its provisions,36 and it purported to be
"declaratory of existing law."
37
AB 75 was designed to preclude courts from using products liability theories
incorporating a risk/utility analysis to hold gun manufacturers civilly liable to
victims of shooting violence.38 When AB 75 was proposed, numerous suits had
27. See John Hurst, Assembly Bill Aims to Head Off Lawsuits by Handgun Victims, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1983, at 3, 20 (claiming that the price of handgun related violence in California was "staggering and could wipe
out the handgun industry ... if it were forced to pay." "[Dallas attorney Windle] Turley acknowledged that if
his litigation [was] successful the handgun industry could be all but wiped out or forced to sell only to special
markets such as law enforcement agencies and sports shooting clubs.")
28. SB 682 (2001) (as amended May 6, 2002); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at I (May 14, 2002).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1714.4 (West 1998).
30. See id. § 1714.4(a) (establishing that "[i]n a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall
be deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury
posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when discharged.").
31. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (1978).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(b).
33. Id. § 1714.4(c).
34. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 75, at 2 (1983-84 Reg. Sess.)
(May 25, 1983).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 5.
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(d) (West 1998).
38. Id. § 1714.4(a); see also SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 75, at 2,
4 (1983-84 Reg. Sess.) (May 25, 1983) (proposing the addition of the language "in a products liability action"
to AB 75 and that provisions therein be applied only to products liability actions).
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been filed nationally against manufacturers of "Saturday Night Special"
handguns.39 Texas attorney Windle Turley was credited with pioneering
litigation40 premised on the theory that Saturday Night Specials are inherently
defective. 4' He argued that the weapon's "availability.... to the general public
causes widespread and severe harm without conferring any substantial social
benefit. 42 In addition to the liability threat posed by the "Turley suits, 43
California's Legislators were concerned that the fallout from the Maryland
Supreme Court decision in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc. 44 would lead to an
explosion of litigation in California against good-faith gun manufacturers for the
violent actions of their customers.45 The holding in Kelley, in addition to
receiving nationwide criticism,
46 was legislatively overturned in 1988.
41
Proponents of AB 75 viewed these suits as being "without merit," stretching
the limits of tort law, and opening "a backdoor [to] gun control.' ' Turley argued
that tradition supported the courtroom as the appropriate forum to debate gun
manufacturer liability and opposed legislative interference.4 9 Based on model
39. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 75, at 2 (1983-84 Reg. Sess.)
(May 25, 1983) (describing Saturday Night Special handguns as inexpensive, lightweight, small, and easily
concealable).
40. See Hurst, supra note 27, at 20 (explaining that "Windle Turley, well-known Dallas lawyer who is
pioneering this type of litigation in about [twenty] suits all over the country, including California").
41. See id. at 3 (stating that plaintiff's attorneys in many suits against weapons manufacturers "argue
that handguns are 'inherently defective' products because the danger posed by these firearms far outweighs any
social benefits.").
42. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 75, at 9-10 (1983-84 Reg.
Sess.) (May 25, 1983) (recanting the position of proponents of "Turley suits" and their reliance on Justice
Traynor's public policy arguments in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) in
favor of strict products liability against manufacturers); see, e.g., Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th
Cir. 1986) (refusing to extend liability to manufacturers of firearms in a suit filed by Windle Turley).
43. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 75, at 9 (1983-84 Reg. Sess.)
(May 25, 1983).
44. See 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) (holding that "it is entirely consistent with public policy to
hold the manufacturers and marketers of Saturday Night Special handguns strictly liable to innocent persons
who suffer gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products"); see also Sayles & Lambden, supra note
22, at 150. (citing Kelley as "[t]he only case thus far to hold a gun manufacturer liable under a strict liability
theory").
45. See Bill Needed to Negate Gun Maker Immunity, MODESTO BEE, June 5, 2002, at B6 (explaining
that "[t]he Legislature granted gun makers broad immunity in 1983, out of concern that a Maryland court
decision ... could lead to lawsuits in [California] against manufacturers who act in good faith but some of
whose customers do not.").
46. See Blum, supra note 22, at § 4[a] (stating that the decision in Kelley has "essentially been
overturned by legislation").
47. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-1(h)(1) (1996) (providing in part that "[a] person or entity may not
be held strictly liable for damages of any kind resulting from injuries to another person sustained as a result of
the criminal use of any firearm by a third person, unless the person or entity conspired with the third person").
48. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 75, at 2-3 (1983-84 Reg.
Sess.) (May 25, 1983) (relaying the position of proponents of AB 75 with reference to the "products liability
lawsuits [being brought] against makers of 'Saturday Night Special' handguns.").
49. See Hurst, supra note 27, at 20 (commenting that Turley insisted such litigation was really a front-
door approach to gun control given that most U.S. safety laws are rooted in common law and applied through
the judiciary rather than the Legislature).
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legislation drafted by the National Rifle Association,5" AB 75 would retroactively
bar all such suits and afford gun manufacturers similar protection from liability
as that extended by the 1978 legislation to "dram shop" operators against suits
alleging sales of alcoholic beverages to "drunks."5'
B. The Decision in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
Judicial application of section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code in Merrill
v. Navegar, Inc.52 sparked criticism that the California Supreme Court afforded
more protection to gun manufacturers than was contemplated by the
Legislature.5 3 On July 1, 1993, Gian Luigi Ferri entered a high-rise office
building at 101 California Street in San Francisco carrying two TEC-9/DC9
semi-automatic assault pistols manufactured by Navegar, Inc. that he used to kill
eight people and wound six others before killing himself.5 4 The subsequent
lawsuit filed by the survivors and representatives of the shooting victims alleged
that Navegar was negligent in selling the TEC-9/DC9 on the civilian market
knowing that it would attract purchasers likely to misuse it. 55 In support of their
argument, the plaintiffs' cited Navegar's advertisements that the TEC-9/DC9
possessed "32 rounds of firepower, . . . excellent resistance to finger prints,
... and all powder residues" and that it "could 'be used in modes of fire
impossible with most handguns.'... including 'hipfire at shortest range."'' 56 The
50. See Allen Rostron, Gunning for Justice, GUN INDUSTRY LITIG. REP., Jan. 2002, at 13 (stating that
"[section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code], enacted in 1983 [was] based upon model legislation drafted by
the National Rifle Association"); see also Protect Kids Not the Gun Industry, Repeal Blanket hnmunity for Gun
Manufacturers, Pass SB 682 (Perata) and AB 496 (Koretz) (n.d.) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(claiming that "the gun industry is allowed to hide behind a special legal loophole written by the [National Rifle
Association]."). Idaho, Montana and North Carolina are the only states other than California that "enacted the
NRA's 'model legislation' to provide broad, blanket immunity for gun manufacturers." Id.
51. Hurst, supra note 27, at 3 (explaining that McAlister "modeled [AB 75] on 1978 legislation that
protects 'dram shop' keepers" that he ironically opposed).
52. 26 Cal. 4th 465,28 P.3d 116(2001).
53. Id. at 492-93, 28 P.3d at 134-35 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); see Recent Case, Firearms Litigation-
Supreme Court of California Holds that State Products Liability Statute Bars Negligence Action Against
Firearms Manufacturer-Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 717, 717 (2001)
(stating "the [California Supreme Court] created for gun .manufacturers an overly broad immunity from
liability."). "[T]he majority would have better effectuated the (L]egislature's intent by looking at the broader set
of policy concerns at work in the statute." Id. at 721.
54. Navegar, 26 Cal. 4th at 470-72,28 P.3d at 119-20.
55. See id. at 481, 28 P.3d at 126-27 (characterizing plaintiffs' claim as "a products liability action based
on negligence, [asserting] that the TEC-9/DC9 was defective in design because the risks of making it available
to the general public outweighed the benefits of that conduct, and that [Navegar] knew or should have known
this fact."); see also id. at 493, 28 P.3d at 134-35 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (stating that "[p]laintiffs allege
negligence, rather, in Navegar's selling that firearm on the general civilian market knowing it would attract
purchasers likely to misuse it, rather than restricting sales to buyers with a lawful use for the tools of assaultive
violence, such as police and military units.").
56. Id. at 471, 28 P.3d at 119; see also id. at 496, 499-500, 28 P.3d at 136-37, 139 (Werdegar, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Navegar additionally advertised that the TEC-9/DC9 allowed attachment of silencers
and flash suppressors, was compatible with a trigger modification to enhance its speed of fire to hundreds of
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California Supreme Court granted Navegar's motion for summary judgment,
reversing the Court of Appeal, and held that the plaintiffs' argument amounted to
the sort of design defect theory that section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code
was enacted to bar.
57
The majority in Navegar found that a product liability action could be rooted
in either strict liability or common law negligence 58 and that the Legislature
intended to bar both species of actions59 evidenced by its use of the language
"products liability," as opposed to "strict liability," in the statute.60 The Court
explained that evidentiary matters relevant to risk/utility balancing in both
negligent design and strict liability actions are similar because to find a product
to be negligently designed is to find it defective. 61 The Court determined that
allowing plaintiffs' to proceed on a negligence action that required a balancing of
a weapon's risks and benefits was contrary to legislative intent. 62 Thus, the
majority characterized the plaintiffs' negligent distribution claim as a design
defect action in disguise 63 and held it to be within the contemplated scope of
section 1714.4.64
rounds per minute, and "conveyed the idea that it could be used to initiate fire in an 'offensive-type
situation.').
57. See id. at 481,491, 28 P.3d at 126-27, 133 (concluding that plaintiffs' argument is essentially one for
defective design that California public policy precludes from proceeding).
58. See id. at 478, 28 P.3d at 124 (stating that "a plaintiff may seek recovery in a 'products liability case'
either 'on the theory of strict liability in tort or on the theory of negligence."'). The "plaintiffs' allegation that
Navegar made the TEC-9/DC9 available to the general public adds nothing to the standard products liability
action." Id. at 481,28 P.3d at 126-27.
59. See id. at 484, 28 P.3d at 127-28 (stating, "we cannot properly conclude, as does the dissent, that the
Legislature intended to preserve a claim based on a manufacturer's alleged negligence in 'selling' its firearm 'to
the general public."'); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 10
(May 14, 2002) (explaining that
what is clearly not possible under the holding in Navegar is any suit that relies on a theory of
design defect, alleging that the gun's inherent potential for harm outweighs its benefits-
regardless of whether such a suit is brought on a negligence or a strict liability theory.... even
if it relies not only on the dangers of the weapon, but on its sale to the general public.).
60. See Navegar, 26 Cal. 4th at 485, 28 P.3d at 129 (stating that "the Legislature did not use the term
'strict liability,' which on its face would not have included use of the risk/benefit analysis in a negligence
action. Instead, it referred more broadly to 'products liability actions' which .... includes both negligence and
strict liability theories of recovery") (citation omitted).
61. See id. at 480, 28 P.3d at 125 (supporting the rationale that a product liability action can be based on
a negligent design theory by exposing the similarity in analysis required to reach either conclusion).
62. See id. at 486, 28 P.3d at 129-30 (finding "no indication that.., the Legislature intended to prohibit
a jury from weighing the risks and benefits of a firearm in considering strict liability while allowing it to
perform the same task in a negligence action").
63. See id. at 481, 28 P.3d at 126-27 (reading plaintiffs' claim to be that Navegar's decision to distribute
the TEC-9/DC9 to the public was negligent considering its particular design characteristics).
64. See id. at 482, 28 P.3d at 127 ("reject[ing] the view of plaintiffs and the dissent that plaintiffs' claim
for negligent distribution to the general public falls outside of [California Civil Code] section 1714.4's scope.").
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The decision in Navegar is indicative of courts' deference to legislatures and
reluctance to create new causes of action by judicial fiat. 65 Because the majority
in Navegar cited legislative support for their holding,66 it follows that a repeal of
section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code indicates a marked shift in legislative
policy.
67
IV. CHAPTER 913: NEW BATTLE LINES DRAWN
The primary effects of Chapter 913 are to repeal section 1714.468 and to
amend section 1714 of the California Civil Code by expressly extending its
provisions to apply to the design, distribution, and marketing of firearms and
69ammunition. Opponents of Chapter 913 argue that it is a veiled attempt at gun
control7° aimed at enriching trial lawyers and bankrupting the firearms industry.
7'
Supporters of the measure seek to even the playing field between firearms
65. See id. at 491, 28 P.3d at 133 (stating that "the Legislature has set California's public policy
regarding a gun manufacturer's liability under these circumstances."); see also id. at 492, 28 P.3d at 134
(Kennard, J., concurring) (explaining the task of the judiciary as to interpret the Legislature's intent and not to
question the wisdom of its judgments); see, e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066
(N.Y. 2001) (expressing reluctance to "[impose] novel theories of tort liability while the difficult problem of
illegal gun sales ... remains the focus of a national policy debate"); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143,
1159 (Md. 1985) (concluding that the establishment of a new cause of action of products liability for "Saturday
night specials" was properly in the domain of the legislature which had pre-empted the field of handgun
regulation).
66. See Navegar, 26 Cal. 4th at 482-83, 28 P.3d at 127-28 (indicating that both the Senate and Assembly
Judiciary Committee of AB 75 support a finding that section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code bars the
plaintiffs' negligence claim).
67. See id. at 482-86, 28 P.3d at 127-130 (summarizing that the legislative intent behind AB 75
pertaining to the enactment of section 1714.4 of the Civil Code was
(1) "to protect manufacturers and sellers of firearms from being held liable in tort for selling or
furnishing a firearm that was used to cause an injury or death"; (2) "to preclude courts from
using products liability theories to hold firearm manufacturers and dealers civilly liable to
victims of firearms usage"; (3) "to prevent the courts from extending products liability laws to
hold a supplier of a firearm liable in tort to persons injured by use of the weapon"; and (3) [sic]
"to stop at birth the notion that manufacturers and dealers are liable in products liability to
victims of handgun usage.").
68. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 2 (May 14, 2002).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (amended by Chapter 913) (adding that "[t]he design, distribution, or
marketing of firearms and ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill required by
[section 1714]"); see id. § 1714(a) (providing that
[e]very one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property
or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, bought the
injury upon himself.).
70. See Letter from Jeff Sievers et al., Legislative Advocate, Civil Justice Association of California to
Members of the Senate (May 16, 2002) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (claiming that "the California
Legislature is attempting to impose gun control without directly banning [firearms].").
71. See Ralph Weller, Who is Liable for the Actions of Criminals? (June 7, 2002), available at
http://www.calnra.org/mfg liability.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (heralding SB 682 and
AB 496 as attempts by legislators to drive firearm manufacturers out of business while "schmooz[ing] their
liberal attorney friends with years of legal billings.").
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makers and makers of other products by removing the gun industry's unique
statutory protection and "clarify[ing] those who design or market firearms or
ammunition owe the public the same duty of care as manufacturers of other
consumer products."
72
V. PLAINTIFFS TAKE AIM
The debate surrounding Chapter 913 echoes much of what was said about
AB 75 prior to the enactment of section 1714.4. 73 Arguments in support of the
passage of Chapter 913 include: (1) gun manufacturers should not enjoy
immunity from liability not afforded manufacturers of other products, 74 and (2) a
repeal of section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code will ensure gun
manufacturers make responsible choices in marketing and distribution of their
products or pay for their reckless decisions.75 Arguments in opposition to Chapter
913 focus on the economic and legal implications resulting from a repeal of
section 1714.4: (1) a repeal will result in the gun industry's exposure to excessive
frivolous litigation, passing the social costs of criminal violence onto lawful
firearms purchasers,76  and (2) section 1714.4 continues to be reflective of
72. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 12 (May 14, 2002).
73. Compare Letter from Alister McAlister, Attorney at Law, to All Members of the California Senate
& Assembly (May 16, 2002) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that the effect of gun maker
liability for non-defective products would be to hamper the industry and "constitute a form of gun control thru
the back door"), and Letter from Jane Elizabeth Lovell et al., McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, LLP, to
the Honorable Martha Escutia, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee & the Honorable Ellen M. Corbett, Chair,
Assembly Judiciary Committee (May 10, 2002) [hereinafter Lovell Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (arguing for repeal or amendment of section 1714.4 to allow "negligence action[s] based on the
conduct of the manufacturer in selling a military assault weapon to the general public" and to ensure "that
manufacturers and sellers of weapons ... will be held responsible when their sales practices do not meet the
standard of care required of all product manufacturers and distributors."), with SENATE COMMITI'EE ON
JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 75, at 3, 10 (1983-84 Reg. Sess.) (May 25, 1983) (relating arguments
in support of AB 75 to concern the spate of litigation against gun manufacturers as "a backdoor attempt at gun
control" and arguments in opposition to herald Saturday Night Special handguns as causing widespread harm
without conferring any substantial social benefit and noting that the "complex ramifications of [gun
manufacturer liability law] should be determined on a case-by-case basis and not summarily eliminated from
the courts' consideration.").
74. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 12 (May 14, 2002)
(stating that "[slupporters argue that it is unfair, and bad social policy as well, to provide special statutory
protection to the gun industry.").
75. See Letter from Charles L. Blek, Jr., President, California State Council, Million Mom March, to
Senator Don Perata (May 3, 2002) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing for repeal of section
1714.4 which provides "gun makers, including makers of assault weapons, [with] total immunity from the
consequences of their negligent marketing practices in [California].").
76. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Hennelly, Deputy Director, California Waterfowl Association, to the
Honorable Kevin Shelley, Assembly Majority Floor Leader (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter Hennelly Letter] (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that because Chapter 913 "would encourage and facilitate
frivolous lawsuits, firearms manufacturers would necessarily be forced to pass on the expense of fighting such
litigation to consumers"); Letter from Dennis Anderson, Legislative Chair, Safari Club International, to the
Honorable Don Perata, Senate (May 17, 2002) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating "SB 682 would
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prevailing case law; 7 7 thus its repeal will only serve to confuse the state of
relevant tort law, pending judicial clarification.7 8
"Economic impact surveys... indicate that the hunting and shooting sports
market generates [annual revenues] in excess of $30.9 billion .... [and] supports
more than 986,000 jobs., 79 According to the Sporting Arms and Ammunition
Manufacturers' Institute, Inc. (SAAMI), thousands of businesses are wholly or
largely dependant on the hunting and shooting markets as the nation's 31.9
million hunters and recreational target shooters spend in excess of $10.7 billion
annually on equipment and trip-related expenses.80 SAAMI notes that money
spent by hunting enthusiasts supports rural populations, with small town
"merchants look[ing] to hunting season the way Macy's looks to Christmas.",81 It
follows that the gun industry's collapse would have profound economic effects
on some societal sectors, but such a result is an unlikely effect of Chapter 913's
enactment,82 especially given the courts' established reluctance to stray from
precedent and create new causes of action in this area of tort law absent
legislative intervention. 3
result in making innocent manufacturers, their employees, and the lawful consumers of their products pay for
the actions of criminals and other wrongdoers.").
77. See Letter from Alister McAlister, Attorney at Law, to All Members of the California Assembly
Judiciary Committee (May 10, 2002) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that section 1714.4 not
only claims to be declarative of existing law, but has been validated as such by the holding in Navegar).
78. See id. (expressing two concerns: (1) that repeal of section 1714.4 is unlikely to impose
manufacturer liability retroactively for guns already present in the State, but could "creat[e] a confusing...
double track for firearms liability" if the door opens on liability for new firearms; and (2) that, following a
repeal of section 1714.4, court's rulings would be unpredictable as the issue of gun manufacture liability
becomes "up for grabs"); see also Letter from Gerald H. Upholt, Manager of Governmental Affairs, California
Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc., to Senator Don Perata (May 15, 2002) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (claiming that Chapter 913 will hold manufacturers liable for how individuals misuse their non-
defective products, "promot[ing] the notion that people are not responsible, nor should they be held
accountable, for their own actions.").
79. See Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers' Institute, Inc., Market Size and Economic
Impact of Sporting Firearms and Ammunition Industry in America (1998), available at http://www.saami.org.
html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter SAAMI] (providing an economic overview of
the gun industry based upon "surveys by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Agencies (Southwick Associates), The
National Shooting Sports Foundation and others"); see also Hennelly Letter, supra note 76 (citing a 1996
United States Federal Wildlife Service study as finding "that hunting generates 704,600 jobs ... representing
almost 1 [percent] of the entire civilian labor force and contributing $22.1 billion annually to the national
economy.").
80. See SAAMI, supra note 79 (reporting that "[t]here are more than 1,100 manufacturers, 100
distributors and 14,000 retailers in the United States whose business is totally or largely dependent on the
hunting or recreational shooting market, according to the National Shooting Sports Foundation.").
81. See id. (claiming that "dollars spent by hunters pack special oomph, because they hit small towns far
offthe interstate.").
82. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at II (May 14, 2002)
(indicating that legislative silence as to manufacturer liability has not put other manufacturers of dangerous
products (e.g. explosives or knives) out of business and that such a fear "seems exaggerated"); see also supra
notes 79-81 and accompanying text (explaining the fiscal impact the demise of the shooting industry may have
on the national economy).
83. See Navegar, 26 Cal. 4th at 491, 28 P.3d at 133 (indicating the court's deference to the Legislature).
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A. Traditional Theories ofLiability and Their Potential for Success
National case law supports gun manufacturer immunity from liability for
non-defective products that are subject to misuse by consumers.84 Two
observations underpin this proposition: (1) most states have not enacted
legislation to protect the firearms industry from liability for criminal shootings,
preferring to follow a common law approach , and (2) plaintiffs have largely
been unsuccessful in recovering against a gun manufacturer on any traditional
theory in the absence of such immunity statutes.8 6 However, in the context of
common law negligence, a window may have opened allowing California courts
to hear suits alleging negligent marketing and distribution similar to that in
Hamilton J.87
While suits invoking a risk/utility analysis in their need to identify a class of
weapons as lacking any legitimate social utility have failed,88 the Hamilton I
approach is concerned with showing that a manufacturer was aware that its
marketing and distribution practices were directed at criminals, thus enhancing
risk to the general public in violation of a duty not to.89 In such suits, a court must
identify the duty owed by the manufacturer to the plaintiff.90 Two arguments
oppose finding duty in this context: (1) the threat of crushing liability on the
industry and (2) the unfairness of imposing a duty on a party unable to have
prevented the resulting harm. 91 The Hamilton I court determined that
manufacturers could avoid "crushing liability.... by marketing and distributing
their product[s] responsibly." 92 Further, the Hamilton I court concluded that
defendants were in control of practices that could have reduced the risk of their
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2 cmt. d (1998) (explaining that
courts have not imposed liability upon the manufacturers of non-defective commonly used, widely distributed
products, even in light of their inherent dangerousness, rather indicating such restriction on commercial
distribution to be more properly within the purview of legislatures and administrative bodies).
85. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 10 (May 14, 2002)
(explaining that there are no "guarantees of liability" with the repeal of section 1714.4).
86. See id. at 12 (observing that only the court in Kelley has imposed liability on a gun manufacturer "on
the grounds that the risks of a class of guns outweighed its benefits"); see Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1160 (holding that
a manufacturer of Saturday Night Special handguns may be held liable for death or injury resulting from the
criminal misuse of its products). But cf supra Part lll.A and notes 46-47 (noting the subsequent legislative
abrogation of the holding in Kelley by enactment of article 27, section 36-1(h)(1) of the Maryland Code).
87. See Hamilton 1, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27 (alleging negligence on the part of a gun manufacturer in
its decision to use certain marketing practices in light of its awareness that its weapons were more likely to
reach criminal distribution networks).
88. See infra Part V.B.1.
89. Polin, supra note 6, § 6 (explaining the theory of negligence tried in Hamilton 1).
90. See Hamilton 1, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (defining the duty sought to be imposed by plaintiffs); see also
Polin, supra note 6, § 6 (discussing duty analysis in various case contexts).
91. Polin, supra note 6, § 6.
92. Hamilton 1, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27; Polin, supra note 6, § 6.
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firearms reaching the hands of criminals.93 Though overturned as inconsistent
with New York law, 94 Hamilton I provides a compellingly effective duty
argument. 95
While California courts have yet to find an affirmative duty owing by gun
manufacturers to victims of gun misuse, decisions in Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance
Corp. and Ileto v. Glock, Inc.9 6 help illuminate the path. The Casillas court
concluded that no legal authority existed for imposing a duty to insure against
third party misuse of a non-defective firearm after discussing the legislative
restrictions set forth in section 1714.4. 97 The Casillas court, however, indicated
that plaintiffs had not presented evidence that the shooter's actions were
foreseeable by defendants or that the advertisements proffered as evidence were
directed at criminals. 98 The court in Ileto similarly failed to find a duty where the
plaintiff's injuries were unforeseeable and too attenuated from defendant's
conduct.99 The Ileto court distinguished the negligent manufacture claim brought
in Casillas from one involving negligent distribution.100 The Ileto court also
noted that, while Merrill involved a claim for negligent distribution, it failed to
allege that defendant's negligence involved targeting criminals; it only alleged
sales to the general public.' 01 The Ileto court, in denying the existence of a duty,
cited to Casillas, Merrill, and the policies expressed by section 1714.4. °2 The
Casillas decision implies that a duty may exist where it is shown that a
manufacturer made a gun for a criminal market or knew or should have known
93. See Hamilton 1, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (stating that defendants could have declined to do business
with careless Federal Firearms Licensees, limited sales at unregulated gun shows, and required that the first
sales to the public take place at responsibly operated stores).
94. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing the result of certification of the duty question
in Hamilton I to the New York Court of Appeals).
95. See generally Hamilton /, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826; see also Polin, supra note 6, § 6 (describing actions
on behalf of injured parties in the context of firearms litigation).
96. See Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp., No. C95-3601FMS 1996 WL 276830 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(determining that the California Supreme Court was not likely to expand liability under the more narrow
standards of negligence when it refuses to allow liability under the broader standard of products liability law);
see also lleto, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1052-55 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (failing to find a duty absent the plaintiffs
showing that the defendant knew or should have known that its product was heavily used by criminals).
97. See Polin, supra note 6, § 6 (explaining that the Casillas court was predicting the extension of
California products liability law).
98. See id. (summarizing the reasoning in Casillas).
99. 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-55 (outlining factors that California courts use to identify a duty as:
(1) the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered an injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of
preventing future harm; (6) the burden on the defendant and the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty with resulting liability for breach; and (7) the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.).
100. See id. at 1050-51 (distinguishing Casillas as having alleged that the gun's physical design was
particularly suited for "a military style assault").
101. Id. at 1051.
102. Id. at 1052.
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that its product was heavily used in crime. 0 3 Similarly, Ileto supports this
rationale in the context of negligent distribution. 0 4 Thus, California courts may
determine the existence of a duty based on a Hamilton I approach following the
repeal of section 1714.4, provided that sufficient evidence is proffered to
demonstrate the foreseeability of injuries resulting from a firearms
manufacturer's targeting of criminals in its manufacturing and marketing
practices. 105
B. Novel Causes of Action
Strict liability for negligent distribution and marketing practices, public
nuisance, and ultrahazardous activity doctrine provide alternative bases for
shooting victims to pursue their claims. 1
06
1. Strict Liability for Negligent Distribution and Marketing
In the absence of section 1714.4, California courts may lend credence to the
holding in Kelley, allowing a plaintiff to recover against a manufacturer upon a
negligent distribution claim alleging that certain types of firearms' attractiveness
to criminals outweighs their lawful utility. 0 7 California courts would be inclined
to consider Kelley because of the similarity of gun control policies in Maryland
and California.'0 8 Additionally, the decision in Navegar will likely no longer be
dispositive of California gun manufacturer liability law for having been so
strongly bolstered by section 1714.4 and the legislative intent behind it.
10 9
Without section 1714.4 prohibiting use of the a risk/utility analysis, a suit
103. See Polin, supra note 6, § 6 (indicating that a plaintiff must introduce evidence indicating that a
criminal shooting was sufficiently foreseeable by a manufacturer for a duty to extend to the shooter's victim).
104. See 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-55 (stating that plaintiffs have not established that the victim's injuries
were a foreseeable result of defendant's conduct or that a special relationship existed between themselves and
defendants).
105. See supra Parts III.A and IV (explaining section 1714.4 and its repeal under Chapter 913).
106. See Garrett Sanderson, Ill, Common Law Strict Liability Against the Manufacturers and Sellers of
Saturday Night Specials: Circumventing California Civil Code Section 1714.4, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 607,
610 (1987) (indicating that plaintiffs have also predicated strict liability upon a duty of manufacturers to control
handgun distribution).
107. See generally Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1143 (extending liability to manufacturers of Saturday Night
Specials based upon the weapon's lack of legitimate non-criminal use); see also Sanderson, supra note 106, at
629 (outlining an ideal scenario for a plaintiffs' attorney to pursue a Kelley-like cause of action in California
courts by arguing for a narrow interpretation of section 1714.4 to apply only to strict liability claims utilizing
the Barker risk/utility analysis).
108. See id. at 634 (noting that the Maryland court decision in Kelley may have persuasive value to
California courts based on their comparable policy approaches).
109. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 10 (May 14,
2002) (indicating that any suit relying on a risk/utility analysis appropriate for design defects, whether brought
on a theory of strict liability or negligence, is clearly not possible); see also Navegar, 26 Cal. 4th at 491-92, 28
P.3d at 133-34 (Kennard, J., concurring) (implying that the Court would be compliant with a change in
legislative policy regarding section 1714.4 or the statute itself).
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predicated on the theory in Kelley must make at least two convincing policy
arguments: (1) that firearms manufacturers will not be subjected to crushing
liability because the suit will target only a class of weapons identified as
Saturday Night Specials without legitimate lawful utility, and (2) that such an
extension of the common law is confluent with the gun control policies of
California and the federal government.
110
The relevant gun control policies involved in imposing strict liability include
deterring crime and compensating victims."' It must be established that criminals
prefer to use an identifiable classification of firearms before the imposition of a
tax on firearms manufacturers can be connected to the deterrence of crime."
2
This is exactly what the court in Kelley attempted by defining Saturday Night
Special handguns as being too inaccurate, unreliable, poorly made, inexpensive,
and easily concealable for legitimate use.
1 3
However, even strict proponents of gun control have conceded that the
majority of weapons used by criminals fall outside of the Kelley court's
definition.' "4 At least one study indicates that widespread availability of firearms
among responsible consumers would result in substantially less violent crime. 15
Further, comparing the number of guns of a particular model used by criminals to
the number used by all consumers fails to statistically expose a criminal
preference for any particular weapon.' 16 Defining a particular weapon by today's
criminals' preferences will unlikely deter tomorrow's criminals whose weapons
preferences may have changed.' 17 Establishing policy based upon such a
fluctuating scale is more likely to limit the supply and increase the general price
of weapons for legitimate users, than to deter criminals whose demand for
firearms is less specific and satisfied through wider avenues of distribution."1
8
This effect may lead to increased gun violence in low-income areas where the
110. See Sanderson, supra note 106, at 633-34 (citing policy concerns likely to be points of contention
for California courts in extending liability under a Kelley approach).
111. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In re 101 California Street: A Legal and Economic
Analysis of Strict Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of "Assault Weapons, " 8 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 41,
48 (1997) (arguing generally that, upon a careful analysis, taxing firearms manufacturers for criminal shootings
will not accomplish either of the two primary motives for imposing strict liability).
112. ld.a149.
113. 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
114. Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 11l, at 49 (citing research done by the Maryland Handgun Roster
Board "that only 28 out of over 1500 handguns reviewed are unqualified for sale").
115. Id. at 48 (citing a study indicating that "[ilf, in 1992, all states had allowed responsible citizens to
carry concealed firearms, there would have been over 1500 fewer murders, over 4100 fewer rapes, and over
60,000 fewer aggravated assaults in 1992 alone.").
116. Id. at 48-49 (arguing generally that the weapons classified as Saturday Night Specials by the Kelley
court have legitimate demand among lawful purchasers as well as criminals, blurring any distinction between
"good" and "bad" guns).
117. Id.at49.
118. Id. at 48-49; see also Hamilton 1, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (explaining the two most prominent
avenues of weapons purchase by criminals to be (1) "straw-purchasers," lawful third-party buyers, and (2) "the
falsification of ATF Firearm Transaction Records at the time of purchase.").
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risk of gun-related crime is higher and police protection more limited." 9 Thus,
with fewer cheap firearms on the market, a criminal user may be inclined to use
more lethal, higher caliber weapons to effectuate his goals, and residents in the
neighborhood he targets will discover the purchase of defensive handguns to
become increasingly financially prohibitive. 20
The imposition of liability on firearms manufacturers is supported by two
notions: (1) manufacturers are in a better position than members of the general
public to spread the risk of loss, and (2) manufacturers can more safely control
the dispersal of firearms in society.' 21 Proponents of tort liability argue that it
offers the additional social benefit of public education via litigation.122 Lawsuits
would expose the public to the numerous safety features available to protect
against unintended firearm use and create financial incentives for manufacturers
to develop safer designs.'
2 3
While gun manufacturers are more financially solvent than criminals, using
tort as a mechanism of victim compensation is criticized as a less economically
efficient or rational approach compared to punishing firearm misuse with already
established criminal and economic disincentives. 2 4 Some argue that the financial
incentives generated by civil liability are too weak to encourage innovative
weapon designs and that liability may discourage manufacturers from risking the
placement of new products on the market. 2 5 Whereas large punitive awards may
only threaten the vitality of small gun manufacturers, civil liability coupled with
enhanced public awareness could lead to government regulation, thus amplifying
the costs to the industry and the corresponding incentives to make safer guns. 1
26
Additionally, plaintiffs should consider raising negligent marketing claims
under section 389 of the Restatement (Second) Torts which provides:
[o]ne who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another's use, knowing or having reason to know that the chattel is
unlikely to be made reasonably safe before being put to a use which the
supplier should expect it to be put, is subject to liability for physical
119. See Kobayashi & Olson, supra note I 11, at 49-50 (explaining that the social costs of imposing
liability on gun manufacturers may exceed the gains because the number of shooting deaths caused by gun
misuse by criminals may rise).
120. Id. at 50.
121. Hamilton 1, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27 (discussing the relevant policy factors that lead to the
imposition of a duty on the defendant to more responsibly market its firearms).
122. See Mark D. Polston & Douglas S. Weil, Unsafe by Design: Using Tort Actions to Reduce
Firearm-Related Injuries, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 17-18 (1997) (exploring the extension of liability for
gun related shooting to gun owners and gun manufacturers).
123. Id.
124. See Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 11l, at 49 (asserting that scholars have traced the recent
expansion and current problems with the tort system to its use as a mechanism for social insurance via liability
awards).
125. Polston & Weil, supra note 122, at 17-18.
126. Id.
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harm caused by such use to those whom the supplier should expect to use
the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use, and who are ignorant
of the dangerous character of the chattel or whose knowledge thereof
does not make them contributorily negligent, although the supplier has
informed the other for whose use the chattel is supplied of its dangerous
character. 
27
Proponents of this approach, used in tobacco litigation, argue that liability
could be imposed upon a showing that a firearm was "unlikely to be make
reasonably safe" after leaving the manufacturer's control and that it caused injury
to a foreseeable victim.' 28 Because neither guns nor cigarettes can be made safe,
manufacturers can only avoid liability under this theory by discontinuing
marketing of such products. 29 However, it is unlikely that courts would rule in
favor of such broad liability given their demonstrated reluctance to impose
liability in more restrictive contexts.
130
2. Public Nuisance Suits
Plaintiffs have begun to introduce litigation based on state law claims,
alleging that firearms manufacturers be held liable for the effects of firearm-
related violence on the health, safety, and welfare of particular communities or
municipalities. 13' The complaint in City of Camden v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.'
32
alleged decreases in property values, decreases in tax base, guns were
unreasonably dangerous and defective products, and gun manufacturers' conduct
provided weapons to criminal markets through gun shows, "straw purchases,"
and "kitchen table dealers.' 33 Public nuisance suits have generally been
unsuccessful against firearms manufacturers in California because nuisance law
does not apply to the manufacture and sale of non-defective products.' 
34
California nuisance law is embodied in section 3479 of the California Civil
Code which provides that a court may consider three disjunctive factors in
determining whether a defendant's actions support the finding of a public
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 389 (1965) (emphasis added).
128. See Jerry J. Phillips, The Relation of Constitutional and Tort Law to Gun Injuries and Deaths in the
United States, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1337, 1348-49 (2000) (comparing firearms litigation to litigation against the
tobacco industry).
129. See id. (comparing firearms litigation to litigation against the tobacco industry and also noting that
asbestos manufacturers were forced to discontinue marketing of their products).
130. See Ileto, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55 (describing the reluctance of courts to impose liability when
"the pool of potential plaintiffs is very large-potentially, any of the thousands of victims of gun violence.").
131. See Polin, supra note 6, § 9 (discussing actions brought on behalf of public entities).
132. 81 F. Supp. 2d 541 (D. N.J. 2000).
133. See Polin, supra note 6, § 9 (describing plaintiff's complaint in Beretta).
134. Ileto, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
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nuisance.' 35 The Ileto court concluded that it did "not have the authority to
expand California law in a way not obviously dictated by precedent."' 3 6 Citing to
City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Company, 137 the Ileto court reiterated that
while California's "broad statutory definition of nuisance... embrace[s] nearly
any type of interference with the enjoyment of property ... ," no California
... decision [has allowed] recovery for a defective product under [such a
theory]."' 35 The Ileto court reiterated a concern expressed by the Eighth Circuit
in Tioga Public School District #15 v. U.S. Gypsum Company,139 that to allow
such recovery, "nuisance 'would become a monster that would devour in one
gulp the entire law of tort."" 40 Further, the Ileto court stated that both the
decision in Merrill and section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code were
predictive of the California Supreme Court's reluctance to impose liability on
firearms manufacturers for distributing their products."4  Because the trend in
California has been to limit the scope of nuisance liability 41 while protecting
firearms manufacturers from strict products liability, the Ileto court dismissed
plaintiffs' claim. 1
43
3. Ultrahazardous Products Liability: Experimental Litigation
Professor Sayles and Judge Lambden propose that strict liability based on
abnormally dangerous activities doctrine144 is better suited than strict products
135. See id. at 1056-57 (listing the factors relevant for a court's consideration:
(a) [w]hether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public
safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether the
conduct is proscribed by statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the
conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as
the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.).
136. Id. at 1058.
137. 30 Cal. App.4th 575, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (1994).
138. Ileto, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
139. 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993).
140. I/eto, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
141. Id. at 1058-59.
142. See id. (indicating that the Court followed the decisions in City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (1994), and Martinez v. Pacific Bell, 275 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1990)).
143. See leto, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (holding that "California law does not support [the plaintiffs'
claim] and because Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that would support a finding that Glock was in control
of the nuisance at the time the [injury occurred].").
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976) (emphasis added) (stating that the following
factors must be considered when "determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous":
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its da.:gerous attributes.
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liability in the firearms litigation arena as a means of compensating injuries and
preventing future harm. 145 Abnormally dangerous activities involve risks that
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of even the highest standard of care.
146
Proponents of this approach define business activities, such as the sale of small,
inexpensive, high-capacity handguns that create an "abnormal" risk of injury to
members of the public who are not consumers of the product in question, as
within the doctrine's reach. 47 Professor Sayles and Judge Lambden further argue
that holding manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their products'
misuse will provide manufacturers an incentive to internalize such costs in the
price of their products. 48 They urge that higher prices will reduce sales of guns,
resulting in fewer injuries from their illegal use. 149 A concern exists, however,
that making guns financially prohibitive to lawful firearms users will not abate
crime but promote criminal effectiveness. 50
Guided by section 520 of the Restatement (Second) Torts,' 5' courts have
refused to accept that selling a product is an "activity" contemplated by the
relevant statutes and that guns are not a "matter of common usage.' 52 Courts
have also been reluctant to apply the doctrine for fear that it would stimulate an
explosion in suits against other products that pose risks to society, such as
automobiles and alcohol, and the issue of its applicability should be reserved for
legislatures. 53 However, proponents maintain that a careful analysis of the
Restatement factors exposes the applicability of ultrahazardous activities doctrine
145. See generally Sayles & Lambden, supra note 22 at 143 (arguing for the resuscitation of abnormally
dangerous activities doctrine against gun manufacturers).
146. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520.
147. See Sayles & Lambden, supra note 22, at 150 (explaining that when an innocent member of the
public is subject to harm due to the business practices of another, the costs should be born by the party that
created the risk).
148. See id. at 155 (explaining that manufacturers would likely respond to increased liability by either
reducing risks in their products or bumping up prices).
149. See id. (claiming that holding manufacturers liable could eliminate the public need to subsidize the
treatment of gunshot injuries).
150. See Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 11l, at 50 (claiming that in the context of reducing the number
of cheap handguns, mortality rates may rise); see also supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the effects of taxing
manufacturers that produce Saturday Night Specials).
151. See Sayles & Lambden, supra note 22, at 152 (citing reasons that courts should reconsider
ultrahazardous activities doctrine in the context of firearms litigation); see also supra note 141 (listing the
factors under section 520 of the Restatement (Second) Torts considered to determine whether an activity is
ultrahazardous).
152. See Sanderson, supra note 106, at 611-12 (indicating that courts have criticized the use of the
abnormally dangerous activities doctrine in firearms litigation for blurring the distinction between it and strict
products liability by referring to the selling of a product as an activity); see also supra Part l[.B (explaining that
the ultrahazardous activities doctrine has failed in firearms litigation because courts have refused to treat selling
or marketing as either abnormally dangerous or activities involving land use within the purview of the
doctrine's application).
153. Sayles & Lambden, supra note 22, at 152.
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to firearms litigation and to the policies underlying the imposition of strict
liability. 114
VI. HIT OR MISS?
Whether Chapter 913 will result in increased liability to firearms
manufacturers for harm caused by firearm misuse is uncertain.155 It is within the
traditional purview of the judiciary to extend liability to manufacturers when
doing so provides the manufacturers with incentive to take public safety into
account in their business decisions.' 56 Most states leave determinations to extend
such liability to the judiciary. 57 However, courts have proven reluctant to extend
such liability to the manufacturer of a product that the Legislature has deemed
lawful.'58 While most states have no laws prohibiting liability for gun
manufacturers, plaintiffs have rarely been successful in recovering on any of the
theories presented above: negligence, strict liability, ultrahazardous activities
doctrine, public nuisance, or negligent entrustment.159 Only the Kelley court has
imposed liability against a firearms manufacturer on a theory that the risks of a
particular class of firearm outweighed its utility and that decision was
legislatively overturned. 1
60
Because the passage of Chapter 913 will repeal section 1714.4 of the
California Civil Code, removing the statutory bar to actions in negligence and
strict liability that rely on a balancing of a firearm's risk and utility, firearms
manufacturers may be subject to increased litigation costs. 161 However, it is
uncertain that such litigation expenses will drive the industry out of business for
at least two reasons: (1) case law does not support the extension of liability to
firearms manufacturers, thus, making litigation both risky and costly to potential
plaintiffs, and (2) firearms manufacturers will be able to manage litigation costs
by incorporating them into the cost of their products and altering product design,
marketing, and distribution practices so as to diminish criminal access to their
products at the headwaters of the commerce stream. 162
While Chapter 913 has leveled the playing field among the manufacturers of
firearms and manufacturers of other lawful products, it has not established a clear
line of fire for potential plaintiffs seeking compensation from gun manufacturers
154. See id. at 152-55 (arguing each element of section 520 of the Restatement (Second) Torts'
applicability to firearms litigation).
155. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 10 (May 14, 2002).
156. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 3 (May 17, 2002).
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id. at 2.
160. Id. at 2-3.
161. See supra Part V (examining the economic impact of Chapter 913).
162. Id.
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for criminal shootings. 63 Because the extension of liability to gun manufacturers
for a weapon's misuse is reflective of the weapon's characterization as lawful,
liability is not certain to follow the repeal of section 1714.4 of the California
Civil Code. 164 Freed from legislative shackles, California courts can examine gun
manufacturer liability issues on a case-by-case basis. 65 Courts thus may be more
inclined to extend liability in cases showing that a manufacturer knowingly
supplied a criminal market and was in sufficient control of its product to have
prevented criminal misuse. 166 However, it seems clear that the California
judiciary will continue to wait for legislative guidance before punishing
responsible firearms manufacturers for producing products designed to kill.
167
163. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 3 (May 17, 2002).
164. Id. at 2-3.
165. SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 7 (Aug. 29, 2002).
166. See supra Part V.A (exploring the Hamilton I decision and its subsequent legislative overruling).
167. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 682, at 3 (May 17, 2002).

